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ABSTRACT 
Computer network and information security are becoming more important as the use 
and availability of the Internet continues to increase. Intrusion detection systems are being 
integrated with computer network security to monitor for misuse or anomalous behavior within 
a computer network. In this thesis, a Distributed ARTMAP (dARTMAP) artificial neural 
network is used to analyze network packet data for anomalies. 
The dARTMAP artificial neural network can perform fast, stable on-line learning in 
real-time with novelty patterns and has the ability to encode rare events. These features make 
dARTMAP a strong candidate for intrusion detection. The dARTMAP's on-line learning 
capability combined with noisy input data can cause the neural network to over-learn resulting 
in an abundance of category nodes and an increase in computations. The architecture of the 
Distributed AR TMAP was modified to incorporate category node pruning and category node 
hibernation to overcome issues associated with category proliferation and computational 
complexity. Pruning attempts to reduce the number of category nodes required to encode the 
information. Hibernation attempts to reduce the catastrophic forgetting introduced by pruning. 
Three pruning techniques and one hibernation technique were examined for their effectiveness 
in maximizing the accuracy of the neural network and minimizing the time required to train the 
network data. 
Since the purpose of the dARTMAP artificial neural network is to detect intrusions, the 
supervised neural network has to autonomously predict the level of intrusion and refine this 
prediction through the learning process. Triggers of the neural network's dynamic learning 
process are used as indicators for intrusive events to predict training outputs for the neural 
network. These triggers correspond to the three fundamental properties of security: 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Increased Internet use and availability are requiring more sophisticated security 
measures. Computer networks are being equipped with security systems similar to homes and 
businesses to protect their valuable assets. Computer network security systems are being 
integrated with intrusion detection to monitor for breaches in security policies. These breaches 
can consist of misuse or anomalous behavior occurring within a computer network. The issues 
behind intrusions come down to trust, motivation, intention, and opportunity. 
In this thesis, a predictive adaptive resonance theory mapping artificial neural network 
called Distributed ARTMAP (d.ARTMAP) is used as an anomaly intrusion detector for off-line 
analysis of network packet data. Because the d.ARTMAP neural network is a supervised 
learning neural network built upon unsupervised learning dART modules, it is capable of both 
misuse intrusion detection and anomaly intrusion detection. Misuse intrusion detection 
requires the knowledge of known network system policies and known network attacks, thereby 
establishing the requirement for supervised learning. Anomaly intrusion detection does not 
require any prior knowledge of network system polices or network attacks, but attempts to 
organize the patterns to indicate novelty, thereby establishing the requirement for unsupervised 
learning since there is no "right" answer. 
Some individuals (Ranum, 1999; Bace, 2000, p. 109) doubt the effectiveness of 
artificial intelligence methods like neural networks for intrusion detection. They perceive that 
neural networks require a training set that needs to span the range of network activity, and the 
training set should be free of attacks otherwise the neural network would think that intrusions 
are normal activity. The idea is that there is no guarantee that data gathered from a real 
computer network will be free of attacks and the output used to train the supervised neural 
network should indicated whether the input data is the result of an intrusion, but that defeats the 
whole purpose of the neural network. So there appears to be a conflict. Also their 
understanding is that the neural network has to learn off-line, which in turn will cause the 
system to consider everything an intrusion when the intrusion detection system is brought on-
line. On the contrary, neural networks that can learn on-line do not require an all-
encompassing training set, and the dynamics of the neural network's learning process can be 
used as triggers to indicate possible intrusions which can be used as an output to train the 
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neural network. Finally, Ranum and Bace also believe that the memory compression causes 
significant loss of information that hampers the neural network's ability to provide information 
about the attack. However when these individuals use the phrase "neural network", they are 
generally referring to a multi-layer perceptron artificial neural network trained using some 
form of backpropagation. Multi-layer perceptron artificial neural networks are known for their 
slow off-line learning and catastrophic forgetting. For best results, the topology usually needs 
to be clearly defined before starting the learning process, and the training needs to be slow with 
multiple epochs to approach a minimum error. The dARTMAP can usually achieve maximum 
accuracy within one or two epochs. 
All of these paradigms suggest that neural networks would struggle to produce 
accurate and dependable results. The paradox is that there are many types of neural networks, 
and as with most engineering, you can only at best asymptotically approach the desired 
objective. This thesis demonstrates that the dARTMAP neural network acts as a novelty 
detector to separate normal activity from abnormal activity. Because of the dARTMAP's 
stable on-line learning capability, the dARTMAP neural network is a sufficient candidate for 
anomaly intrusion detection. 
The dARTMAP artificial neural network can perform fast, stable on-line learning in 
real-time with novelty patterns and has the ability to encode rare events. For the unsupervised 
learning of the embedded dAR T artificial neural network, no formal classification of the data 
needs to be specified. In contrast, supervised learning needs some type of formal classification 
or association. Since dARTMAP can learn on-line and the topology (i.e. the number of 
category nodes) does not need to be pre-determined, the neural network is capable ofreal-time 
intrusion detection. With proper identification of dynamic behavior in dARTMAP, a training 
set free of attacks is not necessary. There are currently considered three impossible conditions 
for a training set to meet simultaneously from a real computer network (Bace, 2000, p. 165): 
• It must be complex enough to be authentic. 
• It must be clean of attacks you don 't want to consider as part of normal activity 
• It must be free of local bias if you want to be able to generalize results across large 
networks. 
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1.1 Computer Network Security 
As computers become more commonplace, computers are being connected to other 
network computers to create computation and information systems. Securing these systems is 
not only beneficial but, in most cases, crucial. The more computers become inter-connected, 
the more difficult it becomes to prevent intruders from exploiting vulnerabilities caused by the 
complex interconnections. 
There are many different definitions of security as well as different levels. Security 
always attempts to protect a valuable asset of an individual or group. So the method of 
protection is what makes security systems unique. The methods may either take a proactive 
(i.e. offensive) approach or a passive (i.e. defensive) approach. The proactive approach takes 
necessary precautions to reduce the chance of being attacked and makes an intruder react to the 
system (i.e. a firewall). The passive approach alarms the intrusion after it has occurred (i.e. 
intrusion detection). An effective security system should combine both approaches. The 
system needs to make the intruder work and react to the system. However if the intruder 
somehow is on the offensive, the system needs to be on the defensive to regain control. 
Computer network security consists of three attributes (Bace, 2000, p. 29): 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Each of these has an associated trust level. 
Confidentiality allows access of certain resources to authorized users. Integrity depicts the 
accuracy of the information being trusted. Availability requires that authorized users can 
access resources upon demand. 
Today operating systems are used to more efficiently control computer operations. The 
operating systems control both local computers and the communication between computers 
within a network. With the continued expansion of the Internet, an intruder could be anywhere 
and still tamper with computers within a network. That is why auditing system operations is an 
important part of security. It helps determine responsibility for system operations and helps 
determine the damage caused by an intruder. 
Intrusion detection, sometimes called the penetrate and patch process, is only one type 
of computer network security. With computer network intrusion detection, a decision has to be 
made whether the data entering the network is acceptable or harmful. When trying to detect 
something, you need to establish a method to identify objects and distinguish those objects 
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from one another. Not only do you need the proper information, but many times you also need 
that information in the proper form. 
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Some enduring questions of intrusion detection are (Bace, 2000, p. 46): 
• How much information is enough to allow you to accurately diagnose security 
problems without crippling the systems you are trying to protect? 
• How do you select the right information to collect, and from where should you collect 
it? 
• How do you manage the information collected to support any legal remedies you might 
want to pursue against attackers? 
• How do you honor your responsibility to handle the information collected about users 
so that you stay within legal, regulatory, and ethical policy limits? 
• How can you format this data so that you can organize and make sense of a wide 
variety of system platforms? Being able to understand various platforms becomes the 
key to performing intrusion detection over complex systems of interest. 
Attacks can have many different forms. They can be spread out over long periods of 
time to hide the overall behavior. Some attacks produce race conditions to overload the system 
and cause denial of service. Other attacks rel;, on fragmenting the packets to cause de-
synchronization within the intrusion detection system. With such various forms of attacks, an 
intrusion detection system must not also become a victim and a target. The intrusion detection 
system must be able to withstand attacks to continue to provide vital security measures. 
During a CSI roundtable (Power, 1998), several industry experts discussed the 
properties of intrusion detection. An intrusion detection system should be able to: 
• perform analysis in real time 
• detect unknown attacks 
• scale to the size of the computer network 
• minimize false alarms 
• create and maintain a comprehensive database of attacks 
• updated on-line without interruption of service 
• exist throughout a computer network 
There are two types of intrusion detection: misuse and anomaly. Misuse intrusion 
detection deals with known attacks and system policy violations. Anomaly intrusion detection 
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looks for abnormal or rare behavior. Abnormal behavior is largely dependent upon the actions, 
motivation, and intent of the individual responsible for the behavior. Only actions are available 
from network data streams. Therefore, motivation and intent would necessarily have to be 
inferred from those actions, which can lead to a large number of false alarms. 
Computer network traffic is similar to car traffic on a highway at night. Driving at 
night has the following characteristics: 
• limited visible range 
• many obstacles affect the driving condition: other vehicles (speed and size), road 
conditions, and weather conditions 
• the destination is only visible when you get sufficiently close 
• you must always be aware of your surroundings, reacting to the environment, and 
taking action upon it 
• many driving violations such as speeding don't get caught 
• there is usually more than one way to reach your destination 
• road congestion can cause delays 
Given the nature of the network data, one would expect a certain periodic behavior on a 
weekly basis. Network data is very much dependent upon the type of work environment the 
computer network is subject to. For example, in a university academic setting, network data 
greatly depends upon the time of day, the time classes are held, the time of a school break, the 
weather, and the current period in the semester (start, mid-term, finals). The network 
environment also places requirements upon the type and level of security. A government 
computer network containing confidential information would need very stringent security, 
whereas an academic environment could not maintain the same level of security because of 
enormous volume of activity. Plus the greater the security measures, the less efficient one 
becomes. So just as in engineering, there are trade-offs between security, efficiency, reliability, 
and performance. 
The dARTMAP neural network can theoretically perform both misuse detection and 
anomaly detection. The network could be trained using levels of danger or risk for the outputs 
used with supervised learning. This would essentially take care of the misuse detection. 
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Anomaly detection can be considered unsupervised learnirig because the implication is that no 
prior knowledge exists about what is acceptable network activity and what is not acceptable. 
The dARTMAP neural network has an embedded unsupervised learning dART neural 
network. Thus the dARTMAP neural network can perform misuse or anomaly detection 
depending upon whether the input matches a pattern already learned. 
1.2 Anomaly Intrusion Detection 
Anomaly intrusion detection deals with the abnormal or rare events that can occur in a 
computer network. For example, if 5 people normally enter a restaurant every hour and 
suddenly 20 people enter in an hour, you would suspect something unusual is happening. 
Thus, anomaly intrusion detection requires the use of some type of profile or prototype, which 
is used to measure the current state against a normal state. Figure 1 (Bace, 2000, p. 39) shows 
how anomaly detection fits into a general intrusion detection system. 
Anomaly intrusion detection is a process of performing profile or prototype based 
I 
learning. Typical methods of generating these profiles involve statistical methods or artificial 
intelligence. That is one reason why neural net .vorks are considered for anomaly intrusion 
detection. The most common neural network is ,he multilayer perceptron trained using some 
form of backpropagation. This type of neural n,~twork suffers from slow off-line learning, 
usually requiring a pre-determined topology for hest results. In contrast, the dAR TMAP 
Policy 
Rules 
Pattern 
Matcher 
Audit Data Source 
Alarm / Report 
Generator 
,A.nomaly 
Detector 
Figure 1. General Intrusion Detection Model 
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artificial neural network can perform fast on-line learning that allows the neural network to add 
category nodes as needed to encode new information. With the addition of category node 
pruning and category node hibernation, the neural network does not suffer from the effects of 
category proliferation, thus reducing the computational complexity and increasing 
performance. 
As the complexity and speed of computer systems increases, the more likely these 
systems will be susceptible to vulnerabilities. The problems typically are the result of mixing 
environments (Unix and Windows NT) and mixing legacy hardware with leading edge 
technology. These vulnerabilities allow intruders to cause unusual behavior to occur within the 
network. 
A system policy for a computer network is an important part of a security system. If no 
system policy is known, then one must rely on network behavior for clues about acceptable and 
unacceptable activity. This is primary purpose of anomaly detection. An anomaly detector has 
to empirically determine the system policy from the network data stream activity. 
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CHAPTER 2. ADAPTIVE RESONANCE THEORY 
Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) was introduced in 1976 by Stephen Grossberg 
based on his work on competitive learning (Grossberg, 1976). With competitive learning, 
neurons compete against each other to remain the only active neuron. As a result, competitive 
learning is commonly referred to as winner-take-all (WTA) coding. Clustering and self-
organizing maps are two examples of competitive learning. 
ART is an on-line self-organizing algorithm capable of stable categorization and 
clustering in real-time. On-line learning is an important feature for adaptation of the neural 
network when used in environments that change over time, allowing the neural network to 
remain an active part of a system. With off-line learning, a system may need to be shut down 
to allow the neural network to learn new features for the system to work appropriately. 
The architecture of an ART neural network (Figure 2) is distinct from a traditional 
multi-layer perceptron because of a competitive layer and stable coding. The basic structure of 
an ART neural network consists of an input layer F0, an input representation layer F 1, bottom-
up L TM weights 1"ij for pattern recognition and filtering, a category representation competitive 
layer F2, and top-down LTM weights 1"ji for pattern generation and template matching. This 
structure is based on the principle of forward/backward projections (Haykin, 1999). For 
Figure 2. Adaptive Resonance Theory Architecture 
orienting 
subsystem 
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stability the unsupervised ART networks use winner-take-all (WTA) coding in which only one 
category node can encode the input pattern. However, WT A coding can cause category 
proliferation during fast learning of noisy training sets. Category proliferation refers to the 
tendency of the ART prototype vectors to become arbitrarily small and large in numbers as the 
size of the input patterns decreases. Leaming occurs in a resonant loop when the top-down 
layer generates a pattern that is similar to the input pattern, within a tolerance called the 
vigilance parameter. 
ART attempts to address the stability/plasticity dilemma to establish incremental 
learning and novelty recognition. This dilemma refers to the trade-off between a system's 
ability to learn new information in an ever-changing environment, and a system's ability to 
remain stable without forgetting. Artificial neural networks adapt to the information that is 
presented to it through its synaptic weights. The stability/plasticity dilemma can be stated as a 
series of questions (Freeman, 1994): 
• How can a learning system remain adaptive (plastic) in response to novelty input, yet 
remain stable in response to noisy input? 
• How does the system determine when to switch between its plastic and its stable 
modes? 
• How can the system continue to learn while at the same time maintain previously 
learned information? 
ARTMAP (Carpenter et al., 1991a) is an autonomous supervised learning neural 
network built from two unsupervised ART neural networks and an associative map. This 
expands the role of ART to the realm of prediction. 
2.1 History of ART 
The history of ART (Table 1) has been a logical progression towards more generality 
with each new addition. For example Fuzzy ART generalizes ART by using fuzzy set 
operations rather than traditional set operations. Distributed ARTMAP generalizes Fuzzy 
AR TMAP by using distributed learning laws and having distributed coding. Under the proper 
constraints, Distributed AR TMAP reduces to Fuzzy AR TMAP. 
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Table 1. ART History 
1976 ART was developed by Grossberg (Grossberg, 1976) 
1987 ARTl was the first implementation of the theory. This was an unsupervised neural 
network with binary inputs using WTA coding (Carpenter et al., 1987a) 
1987 ART2 generalized ARTl by using analog or grayscale inputs (Carpenter et al., 1987b) 
1991 ARTMAP combined two unsupervised ART networks through an associative memory 
to form a supervised neural network (Carpenter et al., 1991a) 
1991 Fuzzy ART generalized ART 1 by using fuzzy set operations and analog inputs 
(Carpenter et al., 1991b) 
1992 Fuzzy ARTMAP generalized ARTMAP by replacing ART networks with Fuzzy ART 
networks (Carpenter et al., 1992) 
1997 Distributed ART generalized Fuzzy ART by using distributed coding and distributed 
instar and distributed outstar learning laws (Carpenter, 1997) 
1998 Distributed ARTMAP generalized Fuzzy ARTMAP by replacing Fuzzy ART 
networks with Distributed ART networks (Carpenter et al., 1998) 
2.2 Distributed ARTMAP 
The dARTMAP neural network (Figure 3) enhances ART by using distributed instar 
and distributed outstar learning laws, an increased gradient content-addressable memory 
(CAM) rule, switching between distributed and WTA coding, credit assignment, and instance 
Distributed ARTMAP 
~--p_r_ed_ic~r-n--&{}--1 
dARTa WT A match WT A 
F3 y 
count 
Cj 
4,----!"'t---t-:::-"tk-:::==K;--,~rort r 
F2 
tTi 
Fo Ai 
a input 
match 
match 
tracking 
Figure 3. Distributed ARTMAP Architecture 
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counting. The purpose of the dARTMAP network is to combine the most desirable properties 
of ART and MLP networks into one, thus creating a fast, on-line, stable learning neural 
network capable of memory compression of noisy unconstrained inputs with real-time system 
dynamics. 
Unlike most supervised learning networks where the actual input and output patterns 
are encoded with some type of mapping, dAR TMAP encodes the association of the internal 
prototypes of the input and output patterns in the map field via the distributed outstar learning 
law. Although dARTMAP can be trained with arbitrary distributed codes for the input and 
output patterns, only a category for an output can be predicted for a novel input using the 
current implementation. 
The architecture of the dARTMAP neural network consists of the following: 
• Complement-coded input layer Fo 
• Bottom-up signal Tj calculated with the L TM subtractive threshold 'tij and the signal 
rule parameter a 
• Category representation competitive layer F2 calculated with Tj and CAM rule power p 
• Instance counting weights Cj to bias the F2 activations 
• Instance counting competitive layer F 3 
• Top-down signal CTi calculated with the F3 activations and LTM subtractive threshold 'tji 
• Input representation layer F, 
• Mapfield Association layer Zk 
The basic design choices for the dARTMAP neural network are given in Table 2. 
Category node pruning and category node hibernation add additional design choices. 
Appendix A and B contain the training algorithms along with flow charts. Appendix C and D 
Table 2. Distributed ARTMAP design choices 
Signal rule parameter 
CAM rule power 
Leaming rate 
Match tracking 
dAR Ta baseline vigilance 
aE(0,1) 
pE(O,oo) 
,8E[0,l] 
lcl small 
Pa E [0,1] 
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contain the testing algorithms along with flowchart. The signal rule parameter is used to 
calculate the bottom-up signal Tj that is used to calculate the F2 category node activations with 
the CAM rule power p in the Increased Gradient Content Addressable Memory (CAM) rule. 
Upon learning the input pattern in the resonant loop, the L TM subtractive thresholds 'tij and 'tji 
are monotonically increased to 1 at a learning rate of~ to reflect the new learned information. 
2.2.1 Distributed Learning Laws 
In the distributed ART (dART) family, the instar and outstar learning laws are replaced 
with the distributed instar and distributed outstar learning laws (Carpenter, 1997) where the F2 
and F 3 category node activations determine the amount of learning. The distributed learning 
laws are generalizations of the original learning laws with WTA coding. 
The long-term memory (LTM) unit for the dART family is a subtractive threshold 
rather than a multiplicative weight in order to avoid catastrophic forgetting. This subtractive 
threshold increases monotonically during learning based on the principle of atrophy due to 
disuse (Carpenter, 1997). The short-term memory (STM) and subtractive threshold together 
create a dynamic weight that restricts the adaptive changes of the LTM unit (Carpenter et al., 
1998). 
The distributed outstar law controls learning of signals leaving the F2 and F3 category 
field. The distributed instar law controls learning of signals entering the F2 and F3 category 
field. 
2.2.2 Increased Gradient CAM Rule 
The increased gradient CAM rule characterizes F2 coding field steady-state activations 
by avoiding large powers of input components. The STM activations are a function of the 
signals Tj to contrast-enhance the input vector. 
2.2.3 Distributed and WTA coding 
The dARTMAP neural network is allowed to switch between distributed and WTA 
coding. WTA coding allows the network to increase its size by adding more category nodes, 
while distributed coding distributes the learned representations across existing category nodes. 
For each input pattern, the neural network will first activate a distributed code. If the 
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distributed code meets the vigilance criteria (see Appendix A Step 3), a prediction is made. 
The neural network will switch to WT A coding when a mismatch occurs with the vigilance 
criteria or when an incorrect prediction is made. With this ability to switch, it raises the 
questions of how much of the time the code actually is distributed. 
2.2.4 Credit Assignment, Instance Counting, and Match Tracking 
Credit assignment is a method to check for active nodes with the correct prediction. 
The neural network checks that each category node's prediction is correct. If the prediction is 
incorrect, that category node becomes inactive and the remaining active category nodes are 
normalized. 
Instance counting keeps track of the number of times a category node has been 
activated. This causes the output prediction to be influenced by previous coding node 
activations. Instance counting can essentially act as a histogram for the input data. 
Match tracking is a procedure to change the dAR Ta vigilance and place the network in 
WT A coding so the network won't encode an incorrect prediction. Complement coding of the 
input is needed to avoid the match tracking anomaly (Bartfai, 1996) so that each input pattern 
has an equal 1-norm. 
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CHAPTER 3. ANOMALY INTRUSION DETECTION 
Anomaly intrusion detection is the process of analyzing data for abnormal or rare 
patterns. This analysis is performed by establishing profiles or prototypes for normal patterns 
and comparing new patterns against the normal profiles or prototypes to determine the degree 
to which the new pattern is different than the normal. 
There are four main parts to this Distributed ARTMAP detector analysis engine: data 
collection from the network, data preprocessing, dARTMAP architecture and dynamics, and 
output response. The input to and the output from the dAR TMAP need to be optimized for 
training performance. These put the restriction on the amount and type of data needed from the 
network. 
3.1 Data Collection 
Collecting data from a computer network can be a difficult task. The data needs to be 
well defined and contain sufficient information about the state of the network. The data 
(Dickerson, 2001) used to train the dARTMAP was captured using tcpdump and processed 
every ten minutes to provide the metrics given in Table 3. 
Srcs 
UnqSrc 
Dests 
UnqDst 
Srvcs 
UnqSrvcs 
Sdps 
UnqSdp 
FrnSdp 
UnqFrn 
Servers 
UnqSrvrs 
Cons 
Atts 
Succ 
Fail 
Unclm 
Table 3. network data metrics 
Number of source IP addresses 
Number of unique source IP addresses 
Number of destination IP addresses 
Number of unique destination IP addresses 
Number of services 
Number of unique services 
Number of service channels 
Number of unique sdp's 
Number of foreign sdp's 
Number of unique foreign sdp's 
Number of servers 
Number of unique servers 
Number of connections 
Number of attempted connections 
Number of successful connections 
Number of failed connections 
Number of unclaimed connections 
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3.2 Data Preprocessing 
Data preprocessing takes the data collected from the computer network and transforms 
it into a normalized input to the neural network. An important characteristic to consider with 
normalization of input elements for the neural network is whether the normalization should be 
linear or non-linear. For example, using a sigmoid function to normalize would ensure that all 
data remain in the interval [O, 1]. However the saturation that occurs at the ends may cause 
adverse effects with certain types of data. 
Since the metrics as given in Table 3 can become arbitrarily large, non-linear 
normalization is required. Each metric was normalized using a sigmoid function 
1 
)x-µ)lo- , 
+e 
where µ is the mean and cr is the standard deviation of the metric. 
3.3 dARTMAP Architecture and Dynamics 
dARTMAP is an on-line stable self-organizing artificial neural network capable of real-
time processing with continuous online learning with the ability to encode rare events. This 
combination of features makes dARTMAP a strong candidate for performing anomaly 
intrusion detection. 
3.3.1 Issues with existing algorithm and architecture 
The Distributed ARTMAP artificial neural network as presented in (Carpenter et al., 
1998) required modification of the architecture and training algorithm. Category node 
hibernation and pruning were incorporated to help reduce the number of computations 
performed during the learning process. Event triggers based on the neural network's learning 
dynamics were established to generated automatic feedback output used for training. 
One issue with the dARTMAP is the addition of category nodes during winner-take-all 
(WTA) coding. WTA coding causes newly added category nodes to lock-in patterns early and 
become associated with only one category node rather than being associated with several 
category nodes. This can cause large numbers of category nodes to be added as more inputs 
are presented for learning, creating a condition known as category proliferation. As the 
number of category nodes increases, so too does the computational complexity because of the 
matrix operations involved in computing the top-down and bottom-up templates/activations. 
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Intrusion detection systems should not degrade the performance the system that you are trying 
to protect because of a large computational overhead. That means that the computational 
complexity of the analysis engine should be minimized while simultaneously maximizing the 
detectors capabilities and accuracy. 
Another important consideration with the dARTMAP neural network is the selection of 
the output used for training. The output should be an indicator for the level of intrusion the 
input represents. The purpose of the neural network is to determine this level of intrusion. 
Therefore the dARTMAP neural network has to autonomously predict the level of intrusion 
and refine this prediction through the learning process. 
3.3.2 Category Node Pruning 
Since the dAR TMAP neural network adds F 2 category nodes as needed to learn the 
input and output associations, the neural network can grow rather large for complex problems. 
As a result, it is important to reduce the number of category nodes to reduce computational 
complexity while not degrading the neural network's performance. The first step to reduce the 
computations required is to reduce the number of category nodes by a method known as 
prunmg. 
Pruning in dARTMAP only occurs during resonance when the top-down adaptive 
thresholds, bottom-up adaptive thresholds, and instance counting are updated. Several pruning 
methods were examined for their effectiveness and performance. Since the learning process 
occurs mainly in the unsupervised dART embedded neural network of dARTMAP, each 
pruning method is based on the activation ofF2 category nodes. 
Consecutive Inactivity Pruning Method 
The first pruning method (Figure 4) counts the number of consecutive times a particular 
category node's activation falls below a value of 1;, where C is the number of category nodes, 
since each category node has a equal probability of becoming activated. A category node is 
pruned if its activation has been below 1; for a specified number of consecutive times called 
the pruning threshold. The premise is that if a category node is not being used frequently 
enough, then calculations involving that category node become wasteful. However, a category 
node that is not activated frequently may encode important rare event information. Therefore, 
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the issue becomes how to maintain this rare even information while at the same time 
eliminating wasteful calculations and memory. As soon as a category node becomes activated, 
the inactivity count is restarted at zero. This helps to reduce pruning a category node 
prematurely. When pruning a category node, the associated top-down adaptive thresholds, 
bottom-up adaptive thresholds, instance counting elements, and map-field association are also 
pruned. 
Let Yr be the consecutive inactivity threshold (Pruning Threshold) 
Let yj be the consecutive inactivity count for category node} 
Step 1. Calculate the consecutive inactivity count for each category node for 
each new input pattern 
r- = J J {Y · +1 y < 1: 
1 0 otherwise 
where yj is the /h category node activation, and C is the number of 
category nodes 
Step 2. Determine the set of nodes that can be pruned 
r = {i = 1,. · ·, c: r 1 r r} 
Step 3. Prune all category nodes j Er and the associated top-down adaptive 
thresholds, bottom-up adaptive thresholds, instance counting 
elements, map-field association. 
Step 4. Renormalize the F2 activation, F3 activation, F3~F1 signal only 
during distributed coding mode 
Y1={y1:J~r} 
F . . Y1 
2 act1vat10n : y 1 = -c--
LY" 
-t=l 
cJyJ F3 activation : Y1 = _c __ _ 
LCAYA 
-<=l 
C F3 Fi signal: a; = I:[Y1 - 'J; ]+ 
}=1 
Figure 4. Consecutive Inactivity Pruning Method 
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Death Limit Pruning Method 
The Death Limit pruning method (Figure 5) is a generalization of the consecutive 
inactivity pruning method. With the first pruning method, as soon as a category node becomes 
re-activated all prior knowledge of its inactivity is forgotten. However, in nature such 
forgetting is not common. The Death Limit pruning method allows the inactivity factor for 
each node be increased or decreased based on the node's activation. 
Let yj be the death limit threshold 
Step 1. Calculate the death limit level for each category node 
y.= J { 
Y · + 8 Y1· < 6 
1 r 1 - y 1 otherwise 
where yj is the /h category node activation, & is small number close to 
zero, and the Death Limit Bias o is a value between O and 1 to bias the 
method towards less or more pruning, respectively. 
Step 2. Determine the set of nodes that can be pruned 
r = {J = 1, • • • , c : r 1 2 r r } 
Step 3. Prune all category nodes j Er and the associated top-down adaptive 
thresholds, bottom-up adaptive thresholds, instance counting 
elements, map-field association. 
Step 4. Renormalize the F2 activation, F3 activation, F3-;F1 signal only 
during distributed coding mode 
Y1=lY1:J~r} 
F . . Y1 2 act1vat10n : y 1 = -c--
LY ,i 
A=l 
C1Y1 F3 activation : Y1 = _c __ _ 
Ic,ly,l 
A=l 
C 
F3 F; signal : Cl; = L [Y1 - r Ji]+ 
}=! 
Figure 5. Death Limit Pruning Method 
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Starvation Pruning Method 
The Starvation pruning method (Figure 6) is a generalization of the consecutive activity 
pruning method. Rather than requiring a strict consecutive inactivity, a category node is 
pruned if it has been inactive YT times within the last Yw patterns. 
Let Yr be the inactivity threshold (Pruning Threshold) 
Let Yw be the pruning window 
Let y1 be the inactivity count for category node j 
Step 1. Calculate the inactivity count for each category node 
y. = j j {
2y +I y < f 
1 2y j otherwise 
where y1 is the /h category node activation, and C is the number of 
category nodes 
Step 2. Truncate the inactivity count to the active pruning window 
Y1=r10(2rw -1) 
where 0 is a bitwise AND operation. 
Step 3. Determine the set of nodes that can be pruned 
Let a(J) ···a(J)a(J) be the binary expansion ofy· Yw 1 0 J 
r={1=1, ... ,c:(tai1l)2'.rr} 
Step 4. Prune all category nodes j Er and the associated top-down adaptive 
thresholds, bottom-up adaptive thresholds, instance counting 
elements, map-field association. 
Step 5. Renormalize the F2 activation, F3 activation, F3 -:>-F1 signal only 
during distributed coding mode 
Y1=V11:Jll1} 
,l=l 
F3 activation: Y1 = / 1Y1 
Ic,\y,\ 
..l=I 
C 
F, F, signal : CY; = L [rj - r Fr 
J=l 
Figure 6. Starvation Pruning Method 
20 
3.3.3 Category Node Hibernation 
Category node pruning can introduce an increased potential for catastrophic forgetting 
as well as chaotic category proliferation where a large number of category nodes added which 
are later pruned. To combat this, category nodes are place in a hibernation state before being 
considered for pruning. So hibernation helps avoid pruning a category node prematurely. 
When a node is in hibernation, it produces no output and the respective subtractive threshold 
values are not updated which adds to the neural networks memory compression ability. Instead 
of eliminating a category node, the hibernating category node is included in the index set of 
refractory F2 nodes L1 thus causing the activation of that node to be O (thus contributing nothing 
to the learning process). This helps to reduce unnecessary computations while at the same time 
maintaining the existing memory. 
Category nodes aren't just placed in hibernation so that they can later be pruned. When 
the neural network cannot encode the information, usually the dARTMAP neural network is 
forced to add another category node in WTA mode. Since there are now hibernating nodes, 
these nodes are temporarily reactivated and the neural network is placed in distributed mode. 
If the neural network is forced to return to WT A mode to add another category node, the 
hibernating nodes are placed back in hibernation. However if a hibernating category node can 
encode the information, that category node is taken out of hibernation. This temporarily 
reactivation requires the dARTMAP neural network to cycle through the search process a 
second time, thus making it crucial to use pruning when using hibernation. 
Category node hibernation (Figure 7) follows a similar strategy to the Consecutive 
Inactivity pruning method. The Consecutive Inactivity pruning method has the most stringent 
criteria of the three pruning methods examined, making it the proper choice to base the 
hibernation method. Since a category node must meet both the hibernation criteria and pruning 
criteria before being pruned, a stringent hibernation criterion will reduce the likelihood of 
meeting the pruning criteria, which in tum reduces the potential for catastrophic forgetting. 
A category node is first placed in hibernation once its activation has fallen below -¼ for 
T/T consecutive patterns (also called the hibernation threshold), where C is the number of 
category nodes. A category node is then pruned after its been in hibernation for rr (pruning 
threshold) consecutive patterns. 
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Let 17T be the hibernation threshold 
Let l7j be the hibernation count for category node j 
Step 1. Calculate the hibernation count for each category node 
17· = J J { 17 · + 1 Y < 1'" 
1 0 otherwise 
where yj is the /h category node activation, and C is the number of 
category nodes 
Step 2. Determine the set of nodes that can be placed in hibernation 
r = {J = 1,. .. ,c: 11j 17T} 
Step 4. Renormalize the F2 activation, F 3 activation, F3~F1 signal only 
during distributed coding mode 
- -{Y1 J rf. r 
Y1 - o JEr 
F . . Y1 
2 activat10n : y j = -c--
LY 2 
/4=] 
C 
F3 F; signal : O"; = I [r1 - r Ji]+ 
J=I 
Step 5. Add the list of hibernating nodes to the index set ofrefractory F2 
category nodes for proper calculation of the F0~F2 signal J;. 
L.\=L.\ur 
Step 6. Upon needing to add a new category node, temporarily reactivate the 
hibernating F2 category nodes and recalculate activations in 
distributed coding mode. 
Figure 7. Hibernation Method 
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3.3.4 Automatic Output Generation 
The purpose of the neural network is to function as an intrusion indicator. For 
supervised learning, the output of the neural network should be that indicator. However, an 
input-output association needs to be provided to the neural network to establish the learning 
process. Therefore, dynamic triggers are required to indicate intrusion, thereby providing an 
output for the neural network to learn. 
Three dynamic triggers are established which correspond to the three fundamental 
properties of security: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. 
3.3.5 Circle-in-the-Square Benchmark Problem 
The Circle-in-the-Square benchmark problem (Figure 8) was used to test and verify the 
results of alterations to the architecture and training algorithm. The goal of the problem is to 
determine whether points within the unit square lie inside or outside a circle with half the area 
and located at the center of the square. The neural network is trained with one epoch of 1000 
randomly selected points and tested with 10,000 randomly selected points inside the unit 
square. The neural network has to predict whether the point lies inside the circle or outside the 
circle. Typically 10 to 20 category nodes are needed to achieve good accuracy. With this 
pruning technique, the similar accuracy has been achieved with only 2 category nodes. For this 
Figure 8. Circle-in-the-Square problem 
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problem, there are only two possible outcomes, inside the circle or outside the circle. So this 
pruning technique is capable of exposing the number of states needed to properly encode the 
information. Because the decision boundary is a circle and adaptive threshold defines 
boundaries as n-dimensional rectangles, it would take infinitely many category nodes to 
achieve 100% accuracy. 
Simulations involving the circle-in-the-square benchmark problems showed that by 
randomly selecting values for key dAR TMAP parameters for each input training pattern, the 
neural network's accuracy and performance are not diminished. In the case of the learning rate, 
the threshold values can become saturated too quickly causing the neural network to become 
sluggish in learning new patterns and even stop the learning process. One way to combat this 
is to vary this parameter during training based on previous levels of activity. 
3.4 Output Response 
In order to make intrusion detection meaningful, a method for reporting the level of 
intrusion is important. Basically, this level associates a number with the event that can be 
compared with other events. A large value would represent a severe intrusion, and a small 
value would represent a weak intrusion. One way to develop such a number is to identify the 
types of intrusions or events to capture and weight them according to their severity. This 
scheme fits very well within the dARTMAP architecture because the output bins can represent 
each of those types of intrusions, and when the dARTMAP generates a distributed output 
rather than simply only taking the largest activation, this intrusion level can be calculated 
directly from the output. This scheme allows the output to be customized for the environment 
in which the intrusion detector is based. 
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CHAPTER4. RESULTS 
4.1 Circle-in-the-Square Simulations 
The selection of the pruning and hibernation methods and parameters were chosen 
based upon simulations of the circle-in-the-square problem. Each combination of pruning and 
hibernation examined (Table 4) was simulated with 100 training sets to overcome variations in 
training set selection. All simulations used the same 10,000 pattern testing set with the 
following parameter values: learning rate~= 1, signal parameter a= 0.01, CAM power p = 1, 
dARTa baseline vigilance Pa = 0. All category nodes placed in hibernation during training 
were used during testing. Larger baseline vigilance results in an increased number of category 
nodes required to encode the input-output association. The performance gained by pruning and 
hibernation as compared to neither pruning nor hibernation is evident with a larger baseline 
vigilance. 
Pruning Method 
None 
Consecutive Inactivity 
Consecutive Inactivity 
Consecutive Inactivity 
Death Limit 
Death Limit 
Death Limit 
Death Limit 
Death Limit 
Death Limit 
Death Limit 
Death Limit 
Death Limit 
Starvation 
Starvation 
Starvation 
Starvation 
Table 4. Pruning and Hibernation Simulation 
Pruning 
Threshold1 (YT) 
5 
5 
50 
2 
2 
2 
5 
5 
5 
15 
15 
15 
2 
2 
5 
5 
Pruning 
Window2 (nr) 
4 
4 
20 
20 
Hibernation 
Threshold3 (rzr) 
0 
0 
15 
0 
0 
15 
50 
0 
15 
50 
0 
15 
50 
0 
15 
0 
15 
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Simulations involving the Consecutive Inactivity pruning method and hibernation on 
the circle-in-the-square problem are summarized in Table 5. With the Consecutive Inactivity 
pruning method, larger pruning thresholds result in higher overall accuracy and precision 
because of a lower number of pruned category nodes. However the increased accuracy comes 
at a price of increased training time due to more category nodes. Lower pruning thresholds 
result in lower overall accuracy and precision, but the time required for training is reduced 
significantly because of a lower number of category nodes. Hibernation helps to increase the 
overall accuracy and training time but decreases the overall precision. Therefore, larger 
pruning thresholds with no hibernation result in higher accuracy, slightly faster training times, 
and a lower number of category nodes. 
Table 5. Circle-in-the-Square Simulation results using hibernation 
and Consecutive Inactivity pruning 
Pruning Method 
None CI5,0 CI 5, 15 CI 50,0 
Maximum 9566 9036 9097 9411 
Accuracy1 Minimum 7924 4615 4988 6008 Mean 9019.87 5590.84 7015.49 8821.61 
Standard Deviation 307.16 993.45 1238.32 415.77 
Maximum 24.68 5.63 8.64 22.99 
Training Time2 Minimum 4.92 5.03 5.32 5.26 Mean 10.11 5.29 6.91 9.70 
Standard Deviation 3.31 0.12 0.81 3.02 
Maximum 30 130 53 34 
WT A nodes added3 Minimum 3 70 6 4 Mean 11.39 98.85 26.61 16.74 
Standard Deviation 4.64 13.07 10.43 6.01 
Maximum 0 129 51 19 
Prune Count4 Minimum 0 69 5 1 Mean 0 97.53 23.76 7.94 
Standard Deviation 0 13.09 10.04 3.64 
1 Accuracy is reported as the number of correct patterns out of the 10,000 testing patterns 
2 Training Time is reported in seconds 
3 WT A nodes added is the total number of category nodes added during training 
4 Prune Count is the number of category nodes that were pruned during training 
CI 5, 0 = Consecutive Inactivity Pruning Method with pruning threshold YT= 5, and 
hibernation threshold 11T = 0 
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Death Limit pruning simulations of the circle-in-the-square problem are summarized in 
Table 6. Each of the simulations involving this pruning method used a Death Limit Bias of 
8 = 0.25. The Death Limit Bias essentially states that the average category node activation 
needs to consistently remain below 0.25 for the category node to be pruned. In contrast to the 
Consecutive Inactivity pruning method, lower pruning thresholds result in higher overall 
accuracy, lower precision, faster training time, and fewer number of category nodes. Based on 
these simulations, a larger pruning threshold produces a larger minimum accuracy with higher 
precision results, but requires more training time and uses more category nodes than with lower 
pruning thresholds. On average the pruning threshold of 5 produced the largest accuracy. 
Table 6. Circle-in-the-Square Simulation results using Death Limit pruning 
Pruning Method 
None DL2,0 DL5,0 DL 15,0 
Maximum 9566 9311 9291 9277 
Accuracy1 Minimum 7924 4948 4948 5263 Mean 9019.87 8227.06 8361.06 8313.80 
Standard Deviation 307.16 1136.73 956.27 931.75 
Maximum 24.68 8.51 9.45 11.81 
Training Time2 Minimum 4.92 4.93 4.99 5.10 Mean 10.11 6.73 7.22 8.19 
Standard Deviation 3.31 0.88 1.05 1.61 
Maximum 30 64 60 46 
WTA nodes added3 Minimum 3 5 4 5 Mean 11.39 29.78 25.13 19.22 
Standard Deviation 4.64 12.18 12.15 10.01 
Maximum 0 58 52 38 
Prune Count4 Minimum 0 2 2 2 Mean 0 25.59 20.41 13.41 
Standard Deviation 0 11.63 11.49 9.20 
1 Accuracy is reported as the number of correct patterns out of the 10,000 testing patterns 
2 Training Time is reported in seconds 
3 WT A nodes added is the total number of category nodes added during training 
4 Prune Count is the number of category nodes that were pruned during training 
DL 2, 0 = Death Limit Pruning Method with pruning threshold YT= 2, and hibernation 
threshold Y]T = 0 
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Circle-in-the-square simulations involving the Death Limit prunmg method with 
hibernation are summarized in Table 7. In contrast to Death Limit pruning without 
hibernation, larger pruning thresholds with larger hibernation thresholds result in higher overall 
accuracy because of a larger number of category nodes. In these simulations the highest 
minimum accuracy was achieved with a pruning threshold of 5 and a hibernation threshold of 
50. Because of the higher hibernation threshold, the time required for training takes just as 
long as it does without pruning and without hibernation. This is caused by temporarily re-
activating all hibernating category nodes when the neural network is search for a category node 
to encode the input-output association. Hibernation decreases the number of category nodes 
added during training and reduces the number of category nodes pruned as compared with to 
Death Limit pruning without hibernation. 
Table 7. Circle-in-the-Square Simulation results using hibernation and Death Limit pruning 
Pruning Method 
None DL 2, 50 DL 5,50 DL 15,50 
Maximum 9566 9350 9345 9393 
Accuracy1 
Minimum 7924 6973 6968 7116 
Mean 9019.87 8665.52 8654.22 8703.34 
Standard Deviation 307.16 487.57 462.81 468.05 
Maximum 24.68 24.01 24.90 28.16 
Training Time2 Minimum 4.92 5.58 5.48 5.49 
Mean 10.11 10.42 10.54 10.76 
Standard Deviation 3.31 3.37 3.51 3.83 
Maximum 30 48 43 44 
WTA nodes added3 Minimum 3 4 4 4 Mean 11.39 14.37 14.35 13.73 
Standard Deviation 4.64 8.01 7.87 7.58 
Maximum 0 31 33 26 
Prune Count4 Minimum 0 0 0 0 Mean 0 6 5.85 4.69 
Standard Deviation 0 5.92 5.49 4.70 
Accuracy is reported as the number of correct patterns out of the 10,000 testing patterns 
2 Training Time is reported in seconds 
3 WT A nodes added is the total number of category nodes added during training 
4 Prune Count is the number of category nodes that were pruned during training 
DL 2, 50 = Death Limit Pruning Method with pruning threshold YT= 2, and hibernation 
threshold 11T = 50 
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The Starvation pruning method with and without hibernation was examined with 
simulations (Table 8) of the circle-in-the-square problem. With this pruning method, larger 
hibernation thresholds can produce higher overall accuracy, and hibernation can significantly 
reduce the number of category nodes added during training and consequently reducing the 
number of category nodes pruned. Each of the simulations with the Starvation pruning method 
and hibernation failed to produce results more accurate than without any pruning. Even though 
this pruning method without hibernation can significantly reduce the training time, it produces 
very poor accuracy. Higher pruning thresholds will promote higher accuracy by increasing the 
number of category nodes resulting in longer training times. The catastrophic forgetting that 
pruning can introduce is evident in the S (2,4 ), 0 simulation since it generally had more 
category nodes but produced lower accuracies than without pruning. 
As the simulations show, pruning can decrease the time required for training due to 
fewer category nodes that would normally require lengthy calculations. The prumng 
Table 8. Circle-in-the-Square Simulation results using Starvation pruning 
Pruning Method 
None S (2,4), 0 S (2,4), 15 S (5,20), 0 S (5,20), 15 
Maximum 9566 6483 9286 8050 9097 
Accuracy1 Minimum 7924 4965 7176 4988 4988 
Mean 9019.87 5085.54 8802.12 5349.75 7015.49 
Standard Deviation 307.16 250.32 334.04 591.99 1238.32 
Maximum 24.68 5.09 41.38 5.64 8.97 
Training Time2 Minimum 4.92 4.81 6.10 5.21 5.41 
Mean 10.11 4.94 12.94 5.41 7.12 
Standard Deviation 3.31 0.05 5.33 0.09 0.84 
Maximum 30 408 50 274 53 
WT A nodes added3 Minimum 3 343 3 221 6 
Mean 11.39 374.71 14.03 246.35 26.61 
Standard Deviation 4.64 13.59 7.72 11.89 10.43 
Maximum 0 408 0 273 51 
Prune Count4 Minimum 0 342 0 219 5 
Mean 0 374.35 0 245.46 23.76 
Standard Deviation 0 13.51 0 11.91 10.04 
1 Accuracy is reported as the number of correct patterns out of the 10,000 testing patterns 
2 Training Time is reported in seconds 
3 WT A nodes added is the total number of category nodes added during training 
4 Prune Count is the number of category nodes that were pruned during training 
S (2,4), 15 = Starvation Pruning Method with pruning threshold YT= 2, pruning window 
Yw = 4, and hibernation threshold Y]T = 15 
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techniques used here can, in some cases, make catastrophic forgetting even worse as evident 
with the very low minimum accuracy for each of the pruning methods. The hibernation 
method used in these simulations can add to the time required for training, but this added 
training time benefits from higher accuracy and lower numbers of category nodes added during 
training. General observations: 
• higher pruning thresholds result in higher accuracy 
• smaller pruning thresholds result in faster the training time 
• smaller pruning thresholds result in fewer number of category nodes 
• the pruning threshold appears to set an upper limit on the number of category nodes 
4.2 Anomaly Detector Simulations 
The dAR TMAP neural network with category node pruning and hibernation along with 
event triggers of the dynamic learning where used to form an anomaly detector analysis engine. 
The dynamic triggers used in the simulations are given in Table 9. The values of the three 
dynamic triggers are added together and then quantized by subdividing the interval [0,3] into 
100 parts. This quantized value was used as the output to train the neural network. The data 
used to train the neural network consists of regularly scheduled ping attacks against a computer 
network. 
With all the simulations, the neural network produced the same set of quantized values: 
subintervals 36 through 45. No correlation was made between the quantized values and the 
times the ping attacks occurred suggesting that either the dynamic triggers used in the 
simulations are not sufficient or the process of combining and quantizing the dynamic trigger 
values does not provide sufficient identification. 
Table 9. dARTMAP Dynamic Triggers 
Security Attribute Dynamic Trigger 
Confidentiality 1 1 2M - -Icr; 
M C i=I 
Integrity 
Availability 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
As information and the Internet continue to grow, securing that information and the 
systems where the information resides are becoming more of a concern. Since firewalls and 
other traditional methods of security are not enough, intrusion detection is become a popular 
addition to existing security methods to determine when misuse or anomalous activity occurs. 
A Distributed AR TMAP artificial neural network was applied to perform anomaly intrusion 
detection using simple data capture from a computer network. 
Category node pruning and category node hibernation techniques were added to the 
dARTMAP architecture to reduce computational complexity, thereby decreasing the training 
time and increasing the memory compression. Category node pruning can usually decrease the 
training time by one order of magnitude. 
The dynamics of the dARTMAP artificial neural network offer many possibilities for 
further investigation. Future research could involve more robust preprocessing, other pruning 
techniques, other hibernation techniques, automation of parameter value selection, and other 
dynamic triggers inside dARTMAP used to flag intrusions. The existing pruning methods 
have the potential to cause catastrophic forgetting. A pruning method should maximize the 
accuracy and minimize the training time while maintaining as much of the existing memory as 
possible. 
The Distributed ARTMAP anomaly intrusion detector used in this thesis was not able 
to properly identify signs of intrusive network behavior. The non-trivial nature of anomaly 
detection combined with the complex dynamics of the Distributed ARTMAP neural network 
require very careful examination of the neural networks dynamics for the subtle indicators of 
intrusive behavior. 
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APPENDIX A. DISTRIBUTED ARTMAP TRAINING 
ALGORITHM 
Definitions: 
a/\ b =min(a,b) [x ]+ = max(0, x) 
Step 1- First iteration: n = 1 
if 1 i M 
{ 
a(!) 
Complement-coded input vector - A; = 1 (i) 
1- a; if M + 1 i 2M 
Output vector- K is the target output class, with b~) = 1 
Set C = 1, Y1 = 1, Y1 = 1, crr = 1 (I= 1, ... , 2M), and K(l) = K. 
Go to Step 8- Resonance 
Step 2 -Reset: New STM steady state at the coding fields F2 and F3 
Fo F2 signal-For j = 1, ... , C: 
2M 
Phasic· S ="A /\ (1- "C ) • J L..i I IJ 
i=I 
2M 
Tonic: ej = I "Cij 
i=l 
Total: T ={Si +(l-a)ei if j~i.\ 
J O if j E i.1 
The CAM rule index set A= {j = 1,- · ·, C: Ti :2: Tu} 
(a) If the network is in distributed mode: F2 nodes are activated according to the 
increased gradient CAM rule. 
F2 activation: 
(i) If(2- a) M-Tj > 0 for alljEA, then: 
1 
Yi =fi(T,, .. ·,Tc)= 1+ I[g=:?~=;~f 
AEA).;tj 
0 
if j EA 
if j A 
(ii) If (2- a)M-Tj = 0 for some j EA, let A"= {j EA: (2- a)M-Tj = 0}. 
Then: 
{ 
l .f . A" - 1 JE 
y i = IA "I , where IA "I is the number of elements in A" 
0 if j A" 
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c.y. 
F3 Activation: Yj = c J J for j = 1, ... , C 
LcAyA 
A=l 
C 
F3 F1 Signal: cri = L[Yj - -rjJ+ for i = 1, ... , 2M 
j=1 
(b) If the network is in WTA mode: Only one F2 node withj = J, is activated. 
(i) Committed node: If A*0, let J be the smallest indexj such that T1 = n:iax{T.} JEA J 
(ii) 
Uncommitted node: If A=0, let J = C + 1. Node J is then newly committed: 
increase C by 1, and let K(J) = K. 
{
1 if j = J 
F2 and F3 activation: yj = Yj = 
0 if j * J 
(iii) F3 F 1 signal: cri = (1 - 'tJi) for i = 1, ... , 2M 
(iv) Add J to the refractory mode index set 11 
Step 3 - Reset or prediction: Check the F 1 matching criterion 
F 1 activation: Xi = Ai /\ cri for I = 1, ... , 2M 
2M 
(a) F1 mismatch: If~ Lxi < p , then do one of the following: 
i=l 
(i) If hibernating nodes are temporarily reactivated, revert to WTA mode and go to 
Step 2 - Reset 
(ii) Otherwise, temporarily reactivate the hibernating nodes by resetting the refractory 
set, revert to Distributed mode, and go to Step 2 - Reset 
2M 
(b) F 1 match: If L xi p, go to Step 4 - Prediction 
i=l 
Step 4 - Prediction 
(a) If the network is in distributed mode, define the F3 F;b signal by 
~k = { t
1 
Yj if K(j) = k for some j 
v ) for k = 1, ... , L 
KU)=k 
0 otherwise 
Let K' be the smallest index k such that cr K' = max {cr k} 
(b) If the network is in WTA mode, let K' = K(J) 
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Step 5 - Match tracking or resonance: Check the output class prediction 
(a) Incorrect prediction: If K':;cK, go to Step 6 - Match tracking. 
(b) Correct prediction: 
IfK' =Kand the network is in distributed mode, go to Step 7 - Credit assignment 
IfK' =Kand the network is in WTA mode, go to Step 8-Resonance 
Step 6 - Match tracking: Revert to WTA mode and resume at Step 2 - Reset after raising 
2M 
vigilance p to the point of dARTa reset. Set p = I:Xi + E 
i=l 
Step 7 - Credit Assignment: Black out F2 nodes that do not predict the correct output class K, 
via Ft F2 credit assignment connections (Fig. 2). Renormalize F2 and F3 and 
recalculate the F3 F1 signal O"j. For i = 1, ... , 2M andj = 1, ... , C: 
_ {Yi ifK(j)=K 
F2 blackout: yi = . ( ·) 0 1f K J :;c K 
F . . yj 2 activation: y i = -c--
~)\ 
A=l 
Cy 
F 3 activation: Yi = c J J 
:~::C1Y1c 
1'=1 
C 
F3 F 1 signal: cri = L [vi - -c ii]+ 
j=l 
Step 8 - Resonance: category node hibernation, category node pruning, L TM memory update 
(a) Category Node Hibernation 
(i) Calculate the hibernation count for each category node 
Y] = J J { Y] · + 1 y < -t 
J O otherwise 
where Yj is the /h category node activation, and C is the number of category 
nodes 
(ii) Determine the set of nodes that can be placed in hibernation 
r = {j = 1,-··,C: 171 17r} 
(iii)Renormalize the F2 activation, F3 activation, signal only during 
distributed coding mode 
F . . Yi 2 actlvat10n: yi = -c--
L)\ 
A=l 
. . ciyi F3 actlvat10n : Yi = _c __ _ 
Ic,,y,, 
A=l 
C 
F3 signal:cri = I[Yi-Tii]+ 
i=l 
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(iv)Add the list of hibernating nodes to the index set ofrefractory F2 category 
nodes for proper calculation of the signal Tf 
ti=tiur 
(b) Category Node Pruning 
(i) Calculate the inactivity count for each category node using the selected method 
Consecutive Inactivity: r . = 1 1 { y. + I y. < 1: 
1 0 otherwise 
{
y.+5 Y1<& 
Death Limit: r 1 = 1 r 1 - y 1 otherwise 
& is small number close to zero, 8 is a value between O and 1 
{
2 y . + I y . < -t; 
Starvation: r 1 = 1 h1 . 2y 1 ot erw1se 
Truncate the inactivity count for Starvation to the active pruning window 
y 1 = y 1 ® (2 Yw - I), where ® is a bitwise AND operation 
(ii) Determine the set of category nodes that can be pruned 
Consecutive Inactivity: r = {i = 1, · · ·, C : r 1 r r} 
Death Limit: r = {J = 1, .. ·, C : y 1 yr} 
Starvation· Let a(J) • .. a(J)a(J) be the binary expansion ofy· 
0 Yw I O J 
r +-1,---,c =(t,aV> J:, r,} 
(iii)Prune all category nodes j Ef' and the associated top-down adaptive thresholds, 
bottom-up adaptive thresholds, instance counting elements, map-field association. 
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(iv) Renormalize the F 2 activation, F 3 activation, F F 1 signal only during distributed 
~odinp m~de 
Y j = lY j : J r J 
F . . yj 
2 achvat10n : y i = -c--
~)\ 
A=l 
. . ciyi F3 activation : Yi = _c __ _ 
:~:::CicY,. 
A=l 
C 
F3 signal:cri = L[Yi--riJ 
j=l 
(c) LTM update 
For I= 1, ... , 2M andj = 1, ... , C: 
Save old values· -r~1d = 't- c?1d = c. 't 0-1d = 't .. ' IJ IJ > J J > JI JI 
Increase F0 F2 threshold (distributed instar): 'tii = -rtd + ~[Yi - -r~1ct -Ai}+ 
I F F · · · h old ncrease 2 3 mstance countmg we1g ts: c i = c i + y i 
Id [ CT - A· ]+ [ Id ]+ Increase F 3 F 1 threshold ( distributed outstar): 't ii = 't~i + 1 1 Yi - 't~i 
cri 
Reset node recovery: = 0 
dARTa vigilance recovery: p = p 
Step 9- Next iteration: increase n by 1 
New in ut: A. = 1 { 
a(1l ifl::;i::;M 
p 1 1-a}'l ifM+l::;i::;2M 
New output: K is the target output class, with b¼) = 1 
Revert to distributed mode 
Go to Step 2 - Reset 
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APPENDIX B. DISTRIBUTED ARTMAP TRAINING 
ALGORITHM FLOWCHART 
start 
Step 1 
get the first input vector 
calculate the complement input vector 
get the first output class 
Initialize F2 and F3 actiwlion 
Initialize F3 F1 signal 
Initialize association 
Initialize pruning 
Initialize hibernation 
end 
Calcuate F2 activation 
according to increase 
gradient CAM rule 
Step 8 Resonanc 
Increase F0 F2 threshold 
Increase F2 F3 instance counting 
Increase F2 F1 threshold 
Reset node recovery 
dARTa vigilance recovery 
get the next input vector 
calculate the complement input vector 
get the next output class 
Calculate F0 F2 signal 
Calculate CAM rule index set 
Calculate F3 activation 
Calculate F3 F1 signal 
Calculate F1 activation 
yes 
Step 4 - Predictio 
Calculate the F3 F000 signal 
Set predicted class to index of the 
maximum signal 
Calculate inacti1<ty count 
Calculate set of pruned nodes 
Prune category nodes in prune set 
Renormalize actiwtions 
Calculate hibernation count 
Calculate set of hibernating nodes 
Renormalize activations 
Add hibernating nodes to Refractory set 
Calculate F2 activation 
Calculate F3 activation 
Calculate F3 F1 signal 
.Md committed node to 
refractory node index set 
Use hibernating nodes 
Change to distributed mode 
Reset node recovery 
Change to WTAmode 
Step6 -
Match tracking 
Step 7 - Credit Assignment 
Calculate F2 blackout 
Calculate F2 activation 
Calculate F3 activation 
Calculate F3 F, signal 
Raise vigilance 
Change to WTAmode 
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APPENDIX C. DISTRIBUTED ARTMAP TESTING 
ALGORITHM 
Definitions: 
a /\ b = min( a, b) [x ]+ = max(0, x) 
Test Step 1-Test vector n: 
{ 
a(I) 
Complement-coded input vector - Ai = 1 (i) 
1- ai if M + 1 i 2M 
if 1 i M 
Output vector - K is the target output class, with b ~) = 1 
Test Step 2 -Reset: New STM steady state at the coding fields F2 and F3 
Fo F2 signal- for j = 1, ... , C 
2M 
Phasic· S = "A /\ (1- 't ) ' J L..,, I IJ 
2M 
Tonic: ej = L 'tij 
Total: Tj = Sj + (1 - a) 0j 
The CAM rule index set A= {j = 1,- · ·, C: Ti ?: Tu} 
F2 activation- increased gradient CAM rule. 
(i) If (2 - a) M - Tj > 0 for all j EA, then: 
1 
Yi= fJTi,· .. ,Tc)= 1+ L[g=:j~=~~f 
AEA,A;,.j 
0 
if j EA 
if j A 
(ii) If (2 - a)M-Tj = 0 for some jEA, let A"= {jEA: (2- a)M-Tj = 0}. Then: 
{ 
l 'f . A" - I JE 
y i = IA "I , where IA "I is the number of elements in A" 
0 if j A" 
c Y· F3 Activation: Yi = c J J for j = 1, ... , C 
Lc,,y,, 
A-=1 
38 
Test Step 3 - Prediction: 
ab • { f vj if K(j)= k for some j 
F3 F0 signal: cr k = )'=I 
K\J)=k 
0 otherwise 
Let K' be the smallest index k such that crK, = max{crk} 
Test Step 4 - Evaluation 
The prediction is counted as correct if K' = K 
fork= 1, ... , L 
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APPENDIX D. DISTRIBUTED ARTMAP TESTING 
ALGORITHM FLOWCHART 
Step 2 
start 
Step 1 
get the next input vector 
calculate the complement input vector 
et the first ou ut class 
Calculate FO ® F2 signal 
Calculate CAM rule index set 
Calcuate F2 activation 
according to increase 
gradient CAM rule 
Calcuate F2 
activation according 
to Point box case 
Calculate F3 activation 
Calculate the F3 ® FOab signal 
Set predicted class to index of 
the maximum s i 1 
Ste 4 
Prediction is counted as correct if K' = K 
yes 
end 
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